Projections of the casualties likely to be incurred during various types of military operations, including peacekeeping operations, are essential for accurate assessments of the health care personnel and medical resources needed to support those operations.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MODELING CASUALTY SUSTAINMENT DURING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS Introduction
Estimates of the casualties likely to be incurred during various types of military operations are essential for accurate assessments of the health care personnel and medical resources needed to support those operations. The types of casualties for which medical resource planning is needed include nonbattle injuries, disease occurrences, psychiatric casualties, and wounds sustained as a result of hostilities. The medical admissions within this last category, while not typically as numerous as those within the combined disease/nonbattle injury (DNBI) category, 1 ' 2 are what are traditionally thought of as "combat casualties" and are the most resource intensive in terms of the supplies and personnel required for treatment.
Military medical models are typically developed to allow planners to gauge the resources needed to support combat operations. For instance, the Medical Analysis Tool (MAT) is a joint service tool designed to estimate the beds and supplies needed to medically support a combat engagement, 3 while the Estimating Supplies Program (ESP) is a Navy tool used to project the amount of consumable supply requirements needed to treat a particular patient distribution. 4 Such models, however, are dependent upon accurate projections of the numbers of illnesses and injuries anticipated, from which the needed supplies and equipment can then be gauged. Thus, casualty models such as CASEST 5 and FORECAS 6 have been developed to provide estimates of the likely patient streams during various scenarios.
Existing casualty projection models have generally focused on providing estimates for conventional combat scenarios. However, in the last decade or so, with the end of the Cold War, deployments of forces for peacekeeping reasons have gained particular prominence. The postCold War period has been characterized by a multitude of civil wars and other intrastate armed conflicts, which have threatened regional peace and security as strife has spilled across nations' borders. As a consequence, this has meant an increased role for U.S. military forces in trying to contain these conflicts and alleviate human suffering. Because most of the data available on peacekeeping operations comes from operations conducted under a UN mandate, the focus of the present investigation is on casualties and casualty trends observed during these types of operations.
UN Operations Analyzed
The UN has maintained records of the fatalities incurred during its peacekeeping deployments over the past 50 years. Because the current effort seeks to develop a modeling capability that can realistically simulate the expected levels of casualties among U.S. troops participating in peacekeeping operations, the decision was made to use, for baseline purposes, only those prior operations in which U.S. troops were involved or operations in regions in which the United States has in the past had a presence.
Ten UN operations, thus, were focused upon to determine the rates of casualties sustained therein. After the operations were identified, the next step was to determine the unit strengths (or populations-at-risk) for these operations. Estimated population-at-risk (PAR) data were obtained for the 10 aforementioned UN operations from documents and Security Council resolutions available on the UN Web site. 21 " 23 It is noted that the unit strength data for these operations were often culled from several sources that separately reported strengths at various points during the operations; thus, these numbers represent close approximations of the forces involved.
Utilizing the PAR data as the denominators and the UN-reported KIA figures (fatalities caused by hostile actions only) as numerators, KIA rates were computed for the 10 cited operations. To obtain an estimate of the numbers of nonfatal wounds that might be expected, news accounts concerning peacekeeping incidents where casualties were sustained were examined for the 15-year period between 1986 and 2000. Utilizing the WestNews® service, electronic searches were performed using the key terms "peacekeeping" (and all variations), "casualties,"
"injuries", "wounded," "deaths", and "killed." From the thousands of hits obtained, 188 separate peacekeeping incidents were identified in the national and international press that represented casualties incurred due to hostile actions during peacekeeping operations. 
Estimated WIA Rates for Peacekeeping Operations
By examining the ratio ofWIA to KIA in the 188 peacekeeping incidents, and by combining this information with the known KIA incidence rates reported earlier in this report, estimates of WIA rates may be calculated for the past peacekeeping operations. Thus, where the ratio of WIA to KIA over the 188 casualty incidents was 4.45:1, and where the mean KIA rate across the 10 aforementioned operations was 0.709 per 1,000 strength per year, then the mean WIA rate can be estimated to be approximately 3.16 per 1,000 strength per year for these operations. However, a simple mean rate across operations does not do justice to the variability in WIA rates that may be observed between differing operations. Table II is a display of the estimated WIA rates for the individual UN operations mentioned previously for which KIA rates were calculated. The estimated WIA rates varied from a low of 0.49 per 1,000 strength annually to a high of 12.50. 
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* Rates are per 1,000 strength per year and derived from operational KIA rates and the WIA:KIA ratio observed in 188 casualty incidents. ** Not estimable from KIA rate.
Severity of Wounds
As previously noted, there were 722 wounded personnel reported for the 188 incidents involving hostilities directed at UN peacekeeping forces. As with conventional military operations, though, there was considerable variability in the severity of the wounds sustained.
Not all accounts of the casualty-producing incidents provided information as to the severity of the wounds incurred. However, 208 of the injuries reported were accompanied by descriptions of whether the wounds were slight, critical, severe, or life-threatening. Figure 7 is a chart depicting the percentages of serious versus non-serious wounds sustained in the documented peacekeeping incidents. Table III incident. Yet there can also be periods of heightened tensions with recurring casualty incidents over brief temporal periods. Figure 8 is a display of the temporal lag between documented casualty-producing incidents during UN operations in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. Data points on the graph represent the number of days between a reported casualty incident and the next such incident. As can be seen, the graph shows a 48-day lag between the first two casualty incidents occurring in the examined time period. The second incident was followed by a zero-day lag (in other words, two separate incidents occurred on the same day) and then by a 14-day lag. as opposed to a direct combat role. Second, adversary factors may be less crucial since unit-tounit confrontation is typically not present in these operations. Finally, while climate and terrain may have some impact on casualty rates for peacekeeping operations, the data on these variables simply do not exist in sufficient quantity to allow modeling of these kind of distinctions.
Variables to be considered in any peacekeeping operation model are duration of mission, some measure of animosity toward the deployed force, and force size. In their paper on UN fatalities, Seet and Burnham classified UN operations at levels that roughly correspond to intensity levels:
Level 1 missions being those with only unarmed observers or civilian police monitors; Level 2 encompassed missions such as those where UN forces were interposed between belligerent forces to prevent the escalation of hostilities; and Level 3 missions were those with "a mandate authorizing use of all measures necessary, including military force, to maintain or restore international peace and security." 24 The authors of this study found KIA rates to be more than twice as high for Level 3 missions than for Level 1 and Level 2 missions. 24 However, the differences between intensity levels for peacekeeping operations are often not clear, particularly
at the outset of a deployment. Some operations, like humanitarian missions, may be fairly benign; other operations, such as the action in Somalia, start off as "peace" missions and end up falling just short of conventional combat. The purpose of a mission can change during the course of the mission, and/or the rules of engagement can be modified. Further, from a casualty standpoint, matters are further complicated by the threat of terrorist acts against barracks and offduty personnel that can yield mass trauma situations.
Notwithstanding the difficulties in modeling casualties, US forces will undoubtedly be involved in peacekeeping operations in the future. On occasion, the United States may play a major role in 14 a military engagement that precedes a subsequent peacekeeping operation. At other times, US forces may be a part of a multinational coalition involving the deployment of American combat and/or logistical troops. To assist medical planners in being prepared for the occurrence of the battle wounds that are a regrettable part of most peacekeeping operations, the Naval Health
Research Center has begun an effort to model the casualties likely to be sustained in such operations. The analyses in the present report provide a starting point for such a model. By utilizing (1) rates of WIA and KIA occurrences observed during past operations, (2) the temporal dispersions of such incidents, and (3) the casualties sustained relative to various weapons possessed by the belligerents, a model will be developed to provide planners with baseline rates of casualties that may be expected during future peacekeeping operations.
